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Abstract—The behavioral experiment presented in this 
paper investigated deception tasks (both concealment and 
lying) undertaken in a public space. The degree of risk of 
deception detection and the demands of self-regulation 
when deceiving were manipulated. The results showed a 
significant interaction effect between veracity and risk of 
deception detection, emerged for the body movement of 
“hand(s) in pocket(s)”. The incidence of “hand(s) in 
pocket(s)” was found to increase from truth telling to 
deceiving conditions when the risk of deception detection 
was higher, and to decrease from truth telling to deceiving 
conditions when the risk was lower. Higher risk of 
deception detection was also found in magnifying the 
“overall negative and controlled impression” displayed by 
both deceivers and truth tellers, compared to the lower 
risk of detection condition. We also discussed the possible 
effects of risk of deception detection and depletion of self-
regulation, on deception behavior. Further studies and the 
connection between this study and the research community 
of computer vision and multimodel interaction is also 
discussed. 
Keywords—deception; detection; impressions; nonverbal 
cues; risk of deception detection; self-regulation 
I.  CUES TO DECEPTION AND THEIR UNDERLYING 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES  
Many research questions in the field of deception behaviors 
are oriented towards practical outputs, and focus on four main 
areas (see reviews in [1], [2]). First, what are the behavioral 
cues to deception? Second, what behavioral cues to deception 
relate to what underlying psychological processes? Third, what 
are the factors influencing deception behaviors? Fourth, and 
most importantly, is how to discriminate between deceivers and 
truth tellers. With the ultimate goal of revealing the difference 
between deceivers and truth tellers, the first two questions are 
discussed in this section, and the third question is specified in 
the next section. Deception does not always take one form, but 
may be presented as a combination of types. We will present an 
experiment conducted in a public space in order to understand 
deception behavior regarding lying and concealment in this 
context, as well as the factors that may alter nonverbal 
behavioral cues to deception, that may distinguish deceivers 
from truth tellers. Nonverbal behaviors were manually coded 
using coding schemes for both body movements and 
impressions displayed by individuals. 
A. Cues to Deception 
Researchers have endeavored to identify deception-related 
behaviors since the 1930s [3]. At present, the most recognized 
categories of deception behavioral indicators are nonverbal and 
verbal cues [2]. Although it has been argued (e.g., [4]) that 
nonverbal cues are unstable and could be influenced by factors 
such as stakes (i.e., the negative or positive consequence of 
deceiving [2]), we believe that there is still a need to 
understand such cues. It is important since verbal statements 
are sometimes not involved in interactions, and/or deceivers 
can manipulate statements when engaging in deceit [5]. In this 
paper we focus on the nonverbal cues that are notable to people 
(e.g., hand movements) rather than the detection of minor cues 
such as micro-facial expressions, as the latter requires 
professional training and may not be learned easily. Moreover, 
on some occasions such as those involving immediate 
judgments of deceit (e.g., a security officer briefly interacting 
with a suspicious individual), detailed analyses are infeasible, 
and these judgments can only be made by relying on cues that 
are clearly observable.  
Deception behaviors are presented inconsistently from time 
to time and more than 20 nonverbal observable indicators were 
identified in the meta-analysis of deception cues [1]. Specific 
deception cues such as decrease in hand/finger movements and 
change in foot movements were found in different studies [1], 
[2]. However, given the inconsistent findings emerging in the 
literature, it is recommended that more investigations be 
conducted so as to replicate and confirm previous findings, or 
to explore deception cues displayed by individuals in different 
settings [2], [6]. Our investigation of observable nonverbal cues 
was thus exploratory: that is, we did not target specific 
movements, but tested a number of observable nonverbal 
behaviors across body sections, as recognized by people 
following the coding process specified in Section III-D. Our 
tests were conducted by comparing any difference in the 
incidence (i.e., either increase, or decrease in the amount) of 
nonverbal movements acquired by blind coding between 
deception and truth telling conditions. 
In addition to the specific body movements, there are some 
cues identified as impressions displayed by deceivers (e.g., 
“tenseness”). We believe that these impressions may contain 
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implicit indicators of deception that are associated with the 
psychological processes underlying deception behavior 
(specified below and in Table II). Investigating impressions 
may also help us to understand intuitions that are used by 
successful deception detectors [7]. Given the important 
information that impression cues may carry, we studied 
impressions displayed by deceivers. The acquisition of 
impressions was conducted via a blind coding process where 
the impression items were developed according to three 
psychological processes of deception (specified below).  
B. Psychological Processes Underlying Deception Cues 
Most deception cues have been linked to specific 
psychological processes of deception (i.e., emotion, cognitive 
effort and attempted behavioral control) [2]. For example, an 
impression of tenseness might indicate a negative emotion of 
fear [5], and decrease in hand and arm movements might be a 
result of cognitive inhibition reacting to high cognitive demand 
[2]. The three underlying psychological processes are 
supported by theory (e.g., [5], [8]) and empirical evidence (e.g., 
[9]), which suggested that deception cues are driven by such 
processes. However, a consistent link between any specific 
deception cues and the three processes is not yet established, as 
it has been found that deception cues are not consistently 
presented by deceivers in studies that took place in different 
physical contexts or surroundings [2]. This reveals the demands 
for investigation in terms of the contextual factors that may 
alter deception cues, as discussed in the next section.  
II. CONTEXTS AND FACTORS ALTERING DECEPTION 
BEHAVIORS  
A. Deception Cues are Subject to Contexts 
Context has been emphasized as important to the 
psychological processes involved in deception, as well as to the 
deception behavior and the nature of deception [2]. For 
example, an individual may not need to speak while passing 
through a security check. Perhaps s/he only needs to 
successfully conceal a weapon or smuggled goods. His or her 
behaviors are determined by such specific type of deception 
(concealment); thus no verbal cues are presented. The form of 
deception and relevant behaviors, as well as the involvement of 
varying psychological processes are inconsistent across 
contexts [2], which result in different cues presented by 
individuals. Therefore, it is difficult to generate a model for 
detecting deception across contexts. However, we believe that 
by assessing deception in different settings, researchers will 
have a better idea of how to discriminate between deceivers 
and truth tellers in similar settings. This is in line with DePaulo 
and Bond’s [6] recent claim for encouraging researchers to 
explore deception in different contexts.  
The present study investigated deception tasks undertaken 
in a public space in order to provide behavioral data about non 
lab-based deception. The deception task combined both 
concealment of an egg timer and a subsequent brief 
conversation with a role-played confederate (see the details in 
Section III-C). This design was employed due to the fact that 
deception does not always take one form, but could present as a 
combination of types. We aim to assess how people behave (in 
terms of body movements and impressions) while deceiving on 
such combined tasks in a public space.  
B. Risk of Failure to Convincingly Deceive  
We have discussed above that contextual factors are 
influential to deception behavior, as they may impact 
individuals’ psychological processes and further influence 
behaviors. Deception in many cases is a risk-taking behavior, 
because failing to convincingly deceive can lead to negative 
consequences for the deceiver (e.g., the relationship between 
two people is affected following a discovered betrayal). People 
who engage in risk-taking behavior not only consider the 
seriousness of the negative outcome that could result from the 
failure to convincingly deceive, but also consider the 
probability of failing to convincingly deceive [10]. These are 
factors that can vary in contexts. The former relates to the 
stakes of deception [2], whereas the later relates to how likely a 
deception will fail, and thus leads to a negative consequence 
for the deceiver. In the present paper, we refer to “risk of 
deception detection” in describing the latter: the probability of 
failing to convincingly deceive. 
Since risk of detection directly determines whether the 
consequence of deception (i.e., stakes) will happen, we propose 
that the risk of deception detection has a similar effect to stakes 
(identified as magnifying the extent to which the psychological 
processes are involved in deception [2], [11]), and thus alter the 
behavior presented by the deceivers. In addition, by 
manipulating the degree of risk of detection instead of stakes of 
deception in this study, we seek to minimize the problem that 
there are few stakes high enough that can be introduced in 
controlled laboratory experiments [2]. It is, however, possible 
to introduce a high probability of failing to convincingly 
deceive by involving a confederate playing the role of “well-
trained lie detector”. The present study manipulates the degree 
of risk of failure to convincingly deceive (i.e., risk of detection) 
by involving a confederate, playing either a trained detector or 
a layperson. Then the difference in nonverbal behavior was 
tested by comparing the incidence of behavior under the two 
conditions of high and low risk of detection. 
Although stakes may magnify deception cues, it is also 
found that stakes can influence truth tellers’ behaviors in a 
similar way [12]. Given the above discussion about the link 
between risk of detection and stakes, this problem may also be 
found in risk of detection. With the aim of minimizing this 
issue, we introduce another contextual factor (i.e., self-
regulation), and predict that the joint effect of these two factors 
can elicit a difference in nonverbal behavior between deceivers 
and truth tellers (specified below). 
C. Self-focus in Relation to Self-regulation 
To return to the underlying psychological processes of 
deception, self-regulation, referring to both the conscious and 
unconscious forms of altering the self [13], is one of the 
fundamental processes of deliberate behavioral control. 
Deliberate deception requires voluntary behavioral control, and 
suppressing the truth can place high demands on self-
regulation. The Self-Regulatory Resources Model [14], [15] 
proposes that self-regulation can be temporarily depleted due to 
high demand of the resources, and may result in failure or 
impaired self-regulation (e.g., [16]). Individuals with depleted 
self-regulation may fail to control their emotional, cognitive 
and/or behavioral responses [14]. Given the suggestions that 
intensive deception relates to deliberate behavioural control 
and brain activity that inhibits conflict between the false 
information and the default truth [17], we propose that the 
impaired or depleted self-regulation of deceivers may result in 
their failure to manipulate/fake behavior, and thus leak cues 
while deceiving. We tested this by comparing the nonverbal 
behaviors between the condition that enhanced demands for 
self-regulation and the control condition.  
In terms of the manipulation of self-regulation, we do not 
want to introduce artificial tasks that induce self-regulation. 
This is because artificial tasks may not be easily introduced in 
real life in helping to spot deceivers from truth tellers. 
Nevertheless, it is recognized that self-focus (usually 
manipulated by inducing self-awareness with a mirror) can lead 
to task-focus, which is highly related to enhancing the demands 
of self-regulation [18]. Therefore, in order to alter the extent of 
the demands on self-regulation, we induced self-focus by 
installing a digital mirror and instructing participants to prepare 
for the deception task in front of the mirror. This not only 
increased the self-focus relating to task-focus, but also primed 
participants to control their behavior prior undertaking their 
tasks. 
D. Predictions 
The present research aims to test whether there are 
significant nonverbal cues and observable impressions 
discriminating deceivers from truth tellers. More specifically, 
we did not test any specific trend of nonverbal cues of 
deception; rather, we investigated any significant difference in 
the incidence (either increase or decrease in the amount) of a 
number of nonverbal body movements across body sections 
and impressions in relation to the underlying psychological 
processes, formed by observers (see details in Section III-D). 
Deception cues are difficult to detect not only because the cues 
are inconsistently presented in different contexts, but also 
because deceivers may attempt to manipulate their behavior 
during interactions by controlling the specific behaviors they 
present [8]. As a result, they may try to be credible and present 
fewer suspicious behaviors than truth tellers [2]. Therefore, in 
order to discriminate deceivers from truth tellers, it becomes 
important to manipulate contextual factors that may magnify 
the difference between them. 
Based on the discussion in Sections II-B and C, contextual 
factors including risk of deception detection and the demands 
of self-regulation are proposed to influence the psychological 
processes of deception. Driven by such psychological 
processes, nonverbal behaviors may be altered by risk of 
detection and demand of self-regulation, showing a difference 
in their incidence between deceptive and honest conditions. By 
manipulating the demand of self-regulation and the risk of 
detection jointly, we aim to amplify the effects of these two 
factors on behaviors and predict a more significant difference 
between deceivers and truth tellers. The joint manipulation will 
also mitigate the problem that the risk of being detected may 
not only influence deceivers, but also truth tellers.  
The study placed participants into high and low risk of 
detection groups, and enhanced the demands of their self-
regulation (control groups of self-regulation were in place for 
making comparisons). Each participant undertook both 
deceiving and truth telling tasks. In line with the discussion on 
risk of detection and self-regulation above, we predict that 
when the demands of self-regulation are enhanced, deceivers in 
the group with the higher risk of deception detection are more 
likely to have their self-regulation impaired compared to truth 
tellers in the same group. Compared with truth telling, 
deceivers’ effort to convincingly deceive increases demands on 
self-regulation. When a higher risk of detection magnifies the 
extent of psychological processes of deception, the magnified 
processes then places higher demands on resources of self-
regulation [13]. Deceivers under conditions of higher risk and 
enhanced demand of self-regulation may experience higher 
overall demand of self-regulation than truth tellers, since truth 
telling does not require as much cognitive resource as 
deceiving (e.g., [2], [4]). The resource of self-regulation of 
deceivers is thus more likely to be exhausted. Following the 
discussion in Section II-C, when the overall demands exhaust 
the resources of self-regulation, the failure to control one’s 
behavior may occur. Deceivers may thus present significantly 
different body movements and/or impressions, compared to 
when they are telling the truth.  
However, different patterns of behavioral changes are 
predicted in groups with a lower risk of deception detection, 
since the impact on psychological processes involved in 
deception is decreased and hence reduced the demand of self-
regulation. In line with the strength model of self-regulation 
[14], [15], the overall demands on the resources of self-
regulation are thus not as high as those in the higher risk 
conditions. Deceivers in this condition are less likely to be 
exhausted and may still be able to successfully control their 
behaviors, presenting fewer suspicious and similar behaviors as 
when they are telling the truth. If, as predicted, by altering the 
risk levels under higher demand of self-regulation, we might be 
able to discriminate deceivers from truth tellers according to 
the distinct patterns of nonverbal cues. In all, the predictions 
for these joint manipulations are as follows.  
When the demand of self-regulation is enhanced: 
• There will be a higher differencea in the incidence of 
nonverbal body movements between deceivers and 
truth tellers under higher risk of deception detection, 
compared to the lower risk groups.  
• There will be a higher difference in the extent of the 
psychological process-related impressions between 
deceivers and truth tellers under higher risk of 
deception detection, compared to the lower risk groups.  
In addition, although there is little direct evidence to show 
that age, gender, cultural differences, and personality 
characteristics can influence deception behaviors [2], it is 
found that age and Big Five personality can influence risk-
taking behavior [19]. The effect of these factors is not the main 
focus of this study, but they are included as covariates so as to 
                                                 
a  This difference concerns both increases and decreases in the amount of 
behaviors (body movements and/or impressions). For some deception cues 
which present as reductions in body movements, we use “significant” 
referring to the significant degree of reduction. 
prevent a significant influence on the results.  
III. METHODS 
A. Participants 
Ninety-two university students were recruited for a study 
entitled “A Smuggling Game”. Valid data from 83 participants 
(38 males, 45 females) were included in the analyses (mean age 
= 20.86 years; SD = 2.42 years). Participants had normal vision 
and hearing (or appropriately corrected to normal), and normal 
ability for body movements and communication. 
B. Apparatus 
The experiment, conducted by three PhD researchers 
(including the confederate playing different roles), took place 
in the corridor of a university building (see the settings in Fig. 
1). As a departmental main building, there were passers-by 
walking through the corridor and passing the experiment area. 
The average number of journeys made by passers-by in the 
corridor was approximately 1270 per day (one single passer-by 
may have made multiple journeys within the experiment area). 
Normally, passers-by did not stay in the experiment area, and 
three participants who were disturbed by passers-by were 
excluded from the data analysis. Four computer bags, together 
with two egg timers were used in the experiment. Self-rated 
questionnaires were administered, containing, a) the Big Five 
Inventory (BFI) [20] assessing the five factors of personality, b) 
demographics form assessing age, gender, and country of 
residence for the majority of one’s life, and c) a short self-
rating questionnaire checking that the manipulations for 
veracity (i.e., deceiving or telling truth), self-rated perception 
of self-focus, and perceived risk of deception detection were 
understood. For instance, the item “I was telling lies during the 
conversation” served to check whether people performed the 
instructed task for the deceptive condition or not. Data from 
three participants who did not understand the experimental 
task were excluded from the analyses. Two video cameras 
were used to record behaviors, one at the waiting area and 
another at the conversation area of the experiment. Each 
participant received £7 for the one-hour experiment (amount of 
reward decided according to the UK national minimum wage 
rates: £6.08/hour) as well as a small extra reward of chocolates.  
C. Design and Procedures 
Dependent variables were (1) individual nonverbal body 
movements and (2) impressions displayed by participants, both 
extracted from the video clips of the experiment sessions via 
content coding (see details in Section III-D). The independent 
variables were manipulated in a 2 (veracity: deceptive vs. 
honest) × 2 (risk of detection: higher vs. lower risk) × 2 
(demand of self-regulation: enhanced vs. not enhanced) mixed 
design, with veracity as within-subject variable (i.e., all 
participants did the tasks for both the deceptive and honest 
conditions) and risk of detection and demand of self-regulation 
as between-subject variables (i.e., participants were separated 
into four groups, with each group doing tasks for one of the 
four combinations of conditions).  
 
Figure 1. Layout of the experiment area. 
The long corridor continues to the right side and, in all, is three times the 
length shown in the figure. See details in Section III-C.  
Each participant completed a behavioral task session, 
followed by a questionnaire session. In the behavioral task 
session, participants were randomly assigned to the four 
between-subject conditions (specified below) and each of them 
performed a similar task twice: one round for deceiving and 
one round for truth telling. The sequence of veracity conditions 
was counterbalanced (i.e., all the possible orders of conditions 
were used) so as to control the order effect. For each round, 
participants were provided with a computer bag, and after two 
minutes of waiting in the waiting area, they then walked along 
the corridor of the university building following a route pre-
designated by the experimenter (as in Fig. 1, they walked 
towards the end of the corridor then took the returning route 
towards a checkpoint). At the end of their route they reached 
the checkpoint (the conversation area) and had a conversation 
(on average lasting two minutes) with the confederate. Once 
the conversation finished, participants completed the short self-
rated questionnaire to check that they understood the task. 
After a 5-10 minute break, they undertook a similar task again, 
with the other veracity condition. Following the completion of 
two rounds of behavioral tasks and the manipulation check 
questionnaires, participants completed a questionnaire pack 
(including the BFI and demographic information) and received 
£7 and chocolates. Debriefing forms were distributed to 
participants, with each participant session lasting 
approximately one hour.  
Deception was introduced in two forms: (1) participants 
were provided with a egg timer that they needed to “smuggle” 
by carrying it inside of the computer bag and walking through 
the route without being detected by others (including the 
confederate and all the passersby), and (2) they were instructed 
to be completely deceptive during their conversation with the 
confederate. They were informed that failing to deceive would 
result in losing an extra reward (i.e., chocolates, blind to 
participants). This was done in order to introduce negative 
consequences. In fact, no detection was performed. In truth 
telling conditions, participants were not given the egg timer to 
conceal and they were asked to tell the truth during their 
conversation with the confederate. They were instructed to be 
as natural as possible. All the participants received the extra 
reward of chocolates at the end of the experiment. 
Risk of deception detection was induced by altering the role 
played by the confederate. For higher risk conditions, the 
confederate played a formally dressed researcher, carrying a 
folder from the FBI academy. Participants in this condition 
were told that the confederate was a researcher from the FBI 
academy who was well trained to detect deceivers and would 
be looking for “smugglers” in the game. The confederate asked 
questions in an inquisitive manner about participants’ identity 
and background information, their subject of study, their 
activity for the day, the length of time that they would be in the 
building, and the content of the bag. The questions for each 
round were different, except the overlapping questions about 
participants’ identity and background information. Participants 
were instructed to tell complete lies or the truth (depending on 
their condition of veracity), regardless of what questions were 
asked. For lower risk conditions, the confederate played the 
role of a student visitor who was new to the university. She 
asked participants to have a chat, since she was waiting for a 
friend. She also showed curiosity about the content of the bag. 
The conversation involved similar topics asked by the FBI 
confederate, but in a friendly rather than inquisitive way. 
However, participants were told that the student confederate 
was not trying to spot smugglers.  
Demand for self-regulation was enhanced by inducing self-
focus. During the waiting period, participants were standing in 
front of a digital mirror in the waiting area (Fig. 1), and 
instructed to be well prepared for the task. For control groups, 
participants were standing in front of a digital screen displaying 
artwork, and were instructed simply to wait for the start signal 
from the experimenter. In all, each participant did both the 
deceptive and truth telling rounds and were randomly assigned 
to the four between-subject groups, each including one of the 
two conditions in the variables of high or low risk of detection 
and self-regulation demanded or control conditions.  
D. Coding 
Behavior data were collected via video recording, and the 
tapes were edited into video clips. There were 166 clips (each 
for one round of the behavioral task, with a length of 1 minute 
16 seconds on average) in total that were then reviewed and 
coded using (1) Coding Scheme-A (Table I) developed based 
on the literature for nonverbal movements [1], [2] and (2) 
Coding Scheme-B (Table II) assessing the impression related 
to psychological processes of emotions, cognitive load, and 
attempted behavioral control. Four coders (Undergraduate and 
Masters students in social sciences at a UK university) trained 
for three hours and coded a 10% random sample of the video 
clips for inter-rater reliability (Cronbach’s alpha for different 
sections of cues: eye section = 0.96, trunk section = 0.83, 
hand/arm section = 0.93, leg/feet section = 0.75, and 
impressions = 0.75). Following the acceptable inter-rater 
reliability, the remaining 90% of clips were coded by two of 
four coders. The numerical data for each clip were finalized by 
averaging the ratings. The coders were blind to the 
experimental conditions and hypotheses, and the clips were 
muted in order to exclude the noise of voices. Movements that 
were presented in fewer than 40% of the participant pool were 
excluded from coding as they were considered less frequent 
movements. The valid movements were presented in Table I. 
TABLE I.  CODING SCHEME-A (BODY MOVEMENT ITEMS) 
TABLE II.  CODING SCHEME-B (IMPRESSION ITEMS) 
 
Using the Coding Scheme-A, the coders coded the 
movements across the body sections. Firstly, they used two 
separate 7-point scales to code (1) frequency of movements 
ranging from 1 = exists to 7 = always (i.e., happens all the time 
in a given clip), and (2) duration of movements ranging from 1 
= brief to 7 = whole session (i.e., lasts for the whole session in 
a given clip). Then they gave an overall rating on the 
proportion of a movement that appeared in the full session in 
one clip (according to the ratings of frequency and duration) 
using a 7-point scale ranging from 1= very briefly existed to 7= 
existed for the whole session. The overall rating was used in 
the final analyses. Missing values were coded as 0, so as to 
represent the absent status of movements. Using the Coding 
Scheme-B, the coders rated the impressions displayed by 
participants in each clip assessing 12 items, on a 7-point scale 
ranging from 0 = impression wasn’t detected to 6 = to the 
greatest extent (e.g., the highest degree of tense). The 
individual impression items were grouped into subcategories of 
impressions with reverse coding of positive items (See Table 
II). The subcategories of impressions were found to be all 
significantly correlated to each other, and were then averaged 
into one item, called “negative and controlled impression” 
displayed by participants. 
E. Data Analysis 
Mixed Design tests of Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) 
were conducted separately for individual movements and the 
impression item. ANCOVA is built on the basis of Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA), which compares means of dependent 
variables (i.e., the value measured for body movements and 
impression) from different groups (conditions of independent 
Body Sections Variable Namea
(Movements) 
Eye Eye contact; Eyes averted; Other eye movements 
Trunk Trunk sway;  Trunk lean towards; Trunk lean backwards  
Hands/Arms 
 
Hands and arms; Hands only; Fidgeting; 
Hand(s) in pocket(s); Hands & objects; 
Arms crossed; Hand holding 
Legs/Feet Legs and/or feet 
aBody movements being included in the analysis were in Bold 
Underlying  
Psychological processes 
Impression Items 
(Appears to be …) 
Subcategories 
of Impressionsa 
Emotional process 
Relaxed  Tense Tense 
Pleased 
Unpleased Unpleased 
Friendly Unfriendly 
Unfriendly 
Cognitive effort Thinking hard 
Attempted 
Behavioral control 
Formal Formal Casual 
Rigid in movements  Rigid Smooth in movements 
Endeavoring to manipulate behavior 
aCreated by grouping the items listed in the second column 
variables) of participants. On the basis of this, ANCOVA 
included covariates (e.g., variables systematically vary between 
conditions of independent variables) that are controlled for 
their possible impact on the findings through the tests that 
compare means [21]. The present study uses a mixed design, 
which contains one within-subject variable and two between-
subject variables. Therefore, Mixed Design ANCOVA tests 
were conducted, which test both the main effect of veracity 
(i.e., within-subject variable) as well as the interaction effects 
of risk, self-regulation, and veracity. The latter interaction 
effects are the focus of the present study, as they may reveal 
the difference of dependent variables between deceivers and 
truth tellers across conditions of risk and/or self-regulation. 
Bonferroni corrections were employed to reduce the chance of 
Type I errors. Demographic information did not significantly 
influence any of the dependent variables, and thus was 
removed from the covariate battery. The Big Five Inventory 
scores were retained as covariates in the ANCOVAs for the 
dependent variables including ten body movements and one 
impression item. Cronbach’s alpha for BFI scores are: 
Extraversion (Bfie) = 0.86, Agreeableness (Bfia) = 0.71, 
Conscientiousness (Bfic) = 0.79, Neuroticism (Bfin) = 0.76, 
and Openness (Bfio) = 0.72).  
IV. RESULTS 
A. Body Movements 
Table III shows the results for the within-subject effects in 
the mixed design ANCOVA conducted for the ten body 
movements. By controlling BFI scores as covariates, 
significant interaction effects between veracity and risk of 
detection were found in “hand(s) in pocket(s)” F(1, 74) = 4.57, 
p < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.06. Amongst the five covariates, 
agreeableness produced a significant effect on the finding, F(1, 
74) = 7.28, p < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.09. An explanation of the possible 
reasons was discussed in Section V-A. There was no 
significant main effect for veracity, suggesting regardless of the 
risk of detection and self-regulation variables, there was no 
significant difference in “hand(s) in pocket(s)” between 
deceiving and truth telling conditions. However, the veracity × 
risk of detection interaction reveals two significantly different 
patterns of “hand(s) in pocket(s)” movements in relation to risk 
of detection and veracity: in the higher risk of detection 
conditions, the amount of “hand(s) in pocket(s)” movements 
decreased from the deceiving (M = 4.13, SD = 3.23) to the 
truth telling condition (M = 3.29, SD = 2.92); this pattern is 
significantly different from that in lower risk conditions, where 
“hand(s) in pocket(s)” increased from the deceiving (M = 3.24, 
SD = 3.30) to the truth telling condition (M = 3.46, SD = 2.99) 
(see Fig. 2). These findings were predicted when the self-
regulation was demanded; however, no significant effect of 
self-regulation emerged in our results. Further discussions are 
presented in Section V-A. 
B. Impressions 
 The results for the between-subjects effects in the mixed 
design ANCOVA (Table III) also revealed that by controlling 
BFI scores as covariates, risk of detection has a strong effect in 
magnifying the “overall negative and controlled impression” 
(this item is created by taking the mean of all the subcategories 
of impressions) F(1, 74) = 18.72, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.20. 
Amongst the five covariates, extroversion had a significant 
effect on the finding, F(1, 74) = 5.75, p < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.07, as 
discussed in Section V-B. There was a greater degree of 
negative and controlled impression ratings associated with 
higher risk of detection levels (M = 2.51, SD = 0.38) versus the 
lower risk of detection levels (M = 2.14, SD = 0.37). These 
findings partially support our prediction that risk of deception 
detection can magnify impressions. However, this effect was 
found regardless of the veracity conditions. There was no effect 
of self-regulation on impressions. Further discussions are 
presented in Section V-B. 
TABLE III.   RESULTS FOR MIXED DESIGN ANCOVAS 
Body Movementa  Impressiona  
Within-subject 
Comparisons 
Hand(s) in 
pocket(s) 
Between-subject 
Comparisons 
Negative & 
controlled 
Veracity Risk of detection 
F 0.41 F 18.72 
Df 1, 74 Df 1, 74 
P 0.53 P 0.00 
ηp2 0.01 ηp2 0.20 
Veracity × Risk of detection Self-regulation 
F 4.57 F 1.46 
Df 1, 74 Df 1, 74 
P 0.04 P 0.23 
ηp2 0.06 ηp2 0.02 
Veracity × Self-regulation Risk of detection × Self-regulation
F 2.31 F 2.02 
Df 1, 74 Df 1, 74 
P 0.13 P 0.16 
ηp2 0.03 ηp2 0.03 
Significant covariateb (Bfia) Significant covariateb (Bfie) 
F 7.28 F 5.75 
Df 1, 74 Df 1, 74 
P 0.01 P 0.02 
ηp2 0.09 ηp2 0.07 
aVariables with nonsignificant findings were not listed (in attachments) 
bOther covariates did not reach significant levels were not listed 
ηp2 = Partial eta square, effect size estimate 
 
Figure 2. Plot of the veracity × risk of detection interaction. 
The plot shows significantly different patterns of hand(s) in pocket(s) 
movements across deceiving and truth telling (honest) conditions between 
higher and lower risk of detection groups.  
V. DISCUSSION 
A. Deception and Body Movements  
The risk of deception detection does lead to differences in 
the amount of “hand(s) in pocket(s)” movements presented by 
the same person in deceiving vs. truth telling conditions. When 
the risk of deception detection is higher, people who are telling 
lies are more likely to put their hands in their pockets, 
compared with when they are telling truth. This pattern is 
significantly different in groups with a lower risk of detection 
(reversed pattern), suggesting that it is possible to discriminate 
between deceiving and truth telling in the same person by 
comparing the pattern of change in one’s “hand(s) in pocket(s)” 
under higher and lower risk of detection conditions. This 
finding also supports our proposition that risk of detection can 
alter deception behavior, as in the case of stakes [11]. Putting 
one’s “hand(s) in pocket(s)” is considered to be a sign of self-
restrained behavior [22]. Increases in such behavior may be 
related to attempted behavioral control during deception. 
Amongst the five factors of personality, agreeableness was 
found to be significantly influencing the deception cue of 
“hand(s) in pocket(s)”. This might due to the fact that 
agreeableness has been found in relation to perception of risk 
[23] and interaction quality [24]. Because personality is not the 
focus of this study, the significant variables were controlled so 
as to prevent their impact on the findings. However, further 
studies may be conducted so as to test the relationship between 
personality and nonverbal cues of deception. 
The finding regarding the different pattern of changes in the 
incidence of “hand(s) in pocket(s)” deception cue between 
higher and lower risk groups partially supports the prediction 
under self-regulation demanded condition. This suggests 
demands on self-regulation resulted in losing proper behavioral 
control (as a result of impaired self-regulation [16]).  However, 
there was no significant difference found in the cue between 
self-regulation demanded and the control groups. One possible 
explanation is that by participating in the behavioral tasks in a 
public space (being watched by many passersby), participants 
already had higher levels of self-focus compared to if they had 
done the tasks in a private space, such as a laboratory. There 
may already be high demands on self-regulation in such a 
public space, which suppressed the manipulation of self-focus 
prior to the task. This may be further tested in future studies. 
Nonetheless, this finding indicates the possible contextual 
effect on deception behaviors and supports our view that 
deception studies should also be conducted in contexts out of 
the laboratory, since the contextual factors may influence the 
effects of experimental manipulations. We believe it is difficult 
to generalize the findings from one specific context broadly. It 
is more appropriate to explore deception behaviors in several 
specific contexts and use the findings for lie detection only in 
similar contexts. We also suggest that researchers compare 
deceptive behaviors with truth telling behaviors within the 
same person. This will reduce any unknown influence of 
individual differences in relation to deception behavior [2]. 
Most deception studies focus on identifying cues to 
deception yet it is also important to look for evidence revealing 
the underlying psychological processes (such as self-
regulation) of such cues. While suggesting that the role of self-
regulation may result in leakages of deception cues, we 
consider that their depletion may not only be reflected in 
individual cues. Desteno et al. [25] recently found that by 
combining individual body movements into one variable, 
deception can be distinguished from truth telling. However, 
combining the individual movements properly requires specific 
temporal information for each movement. The onset/offset of 
cues is an important criterion in determining which individual 
movements could be combined together to serve as a 
movement set. This information can be obtained by using video 
annotation applications and we encourage researchers in the 
field of computer vision to perform analysis on such 
information.  
B. Deception and Overall Impressions  
Risk of deception detection shows a strong effect on the 
overall negative and controlled impression displayed by 
individuals. Such an impression is considered a sign of 
negative emotion and over-control of behavior, which are 
related to psychological processes of deception [2]. This 
finding suggests that with a higher risk of detection, deceivers 
tend to demonstrate more negative affect and controlled 
behavior, as compared to when risk of detection is lower. This 
indicates that the risk of deception detection can lead to 
magnified impression cues in deceivers. However, as predicted, 
this effect also influences truth tellers, who presented a similar 
pattern to deceivers. These support the idea that the risk of 
deception detection has similar properties to the stakes of 
deceiving [11], [12]. Due to the strong effect of risk of 
detection on impressions displayed by both deceiving and truth 
telling individuals, we encourage researchers to pay as much 
attention to the risk of detection as to stakes in regards to how 
the risk of detection can influence nonverbal behaviors 
including body movements and impressions. The finding also 
suggests that the personality factor of extraversion significantly 
influences the impressions displayed by participants. Although 
it has been found that extraverts and introverts present different 
behavior when they lie [2], further studies may be conducted so 
as to explore any direct relationship between this personality 
factor and deception behavior.  
C. Limitations and Further Studies 
There are other methods to assess veracity, risk of 
detection, and the demands of self-regulation. For example, the 
demand of self-regulation can be increased by introducing 
additional self-regulatory tasks or questionnaires prior the 
deception task (e.g., in [26]). However, we did not use these 
tasks since we wished to use a realistic intervention (mirror) 
that introduces few artificial effects into the experiment. 
Nonetheless, it is also useful to test the effect of these factors 
on deception in different forms and settings. In addition, we 
administered subjective coding so as to assess cues that could 
be observed easily by human beings. However, we also 
recommend the automatic annotation of a broader range of 
behavioral cues to be performed, in order to assess more 
detailed deception behaviors that are not visible to the human 
eye.  
We believe that the findings of this study will provide 
information concerning nonverbal deception behavior to 
researchers within the community of computer vision and 
multimodal interaction. More specifically, there are three main 
points that we want to highlight for researchers interested in 
this area.  
First, the specific body movement of “hand(s) in pocket(s)” 
found in relation to deception may carry information about the 
mental status of individuals while deceiving. This nonverbal 
cue may be considered in future studies concerning the 
recognition, generation or automated detection of deception 
behavior. In addition, we found a negative and controlled 
impression has a strong relationship with the risk of deception 
detection. This suggests the significant influence of risk of 
deception detection on behavior concerning emotional 
communication. Although such an impression was not found in 
relation to deception, we still recommend that researchers who 
conduct automated detection of deception take into account the 
effect that risk may place on the overall negative and controlled 
impression cue. Second, the movement and impression cues 
found in this study reflected individuals’ reactions to another 
person during face-to-face interaction and/or their reaction to 
contextual factors (e.g., risk of detection). We believe our 
findings will provide information to researchers interested in 
generating or processing face-to-face interaction between 
human-human and human-artificial conversational partners. 
More specifically, we provided the information concerning the 
effect of the interaction on human beings and nonverbal 
behavior that is sensitive to contextual factors such as the risk 
of deception detection. We also support researchers who are 
working on developing visual perception system for deception 
detection or researchers generating deception behavior using 
robots, to take these findings into account. Further studies that 
test the effects of environmental factors (e.g., the degree of 
publicity) on deception behavior are also recommended.  
Finally, the present study has assessed deception, including 
both the concealment of an object and lying. We suggest 
attempts to investigate deception involving multiple types and 
greater task complexity, as complex deception leads to greater 
cognitive load [4] than simple tasks (e.g., to reply ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
to a simple question). We believe that extending the 
investigation to natural settings with complex task will be 
beneficial to further real world applications of experimental 
findings.  
As DePaulo and Bond [6] suggested, the exploration of 
deception behavior should not be limited to a specific context 
or paradigm. There are diverse kinds of deceit, and also diverse 
contextual factors in the real world. 
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